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Opinion
Heigh-Ho: CPS and the seven questions – some
thoughts on contemporary Complex Problem
Solving research
Jens F. Beckmann1
1Durham University, United Kingdom.
In this paper, I share some reflections on a set of ques-
tions posed by the editors of Journal for Dynamic Decision
Making in relation to research in complex problem solving
(CPS). These questions, especially in their combination,
suggest problems in CPS research with regard to iden-
tity, direction, and purpose. I focus on three issues. The
first issue is the diversity in objectives and methodological
approaches subsumed under the label of CPS. The result-
ing conceptual ambiguity makes it challenging to define
CPS and thus, to identify ways to develop CPS research
further. The second issue is the tendency in contempo-
rary CPS research to employ psychometrics for autotelic
purposes rather than utilising it as the tool that helps
linking the conceptual with the empirical in psychological
research. The third issue refers to the conceptual vac-
uum around the essential element of CPS, namely the
concept of complexity. The tendency to substitute com-
plexity (as a psychological concept) with difficulty (as a
psychometric concept) tends to perpetuate the existing
conceptual limitations and to compound the circularity
associated with an operational definition of CPS. Indiffer-
ence towards these issues is major hindrance to resolving
the issues around identity, direction and purpose, and to
making meaningful progress in CPS research.
Heigh-Ho: CPS and the seven questions –
some thoughts on contemporary Complex
Problem Solving research
As Henry Louis Mencken could have said, for every com-
plex problem there is an easy solution that is neat, plau-
sible, and wrong1. I think it will not come to anyone’s
surprise that this rings also true for research in complex
problem solving (CPS). Therefore, I shall not attempt to
offer neat answers to the seven questions about CPS as
they have been posed by the editors of this special issue.
In the well-known fairy tale, each of the seven dwarfs asked
a question when they – to their surprise – encountered the
presence of Snow White in their abode after returning from
a hard day’s work in the mine. Whilst their questions led
to one unifying answer, I do not expect this to be the case
for the CPS-related questions asked here. Also, these CPS-
related questions do not come to anyone’s surprise, I am
afraid:
(Q1) Why should there be CPS research? (Q2) How does
current CPS research contribute to solving “real life” prob-
lems? (Q3) Can laboratory-based CPS research be rele-
vant? (Q4) What is the role of knowledge in CPS? (Q5)
What is the role of strategies in CPS? (Q6) What is the role
of intuition in CPS? (Q7) Do experts solve CPS problems
differently to laypersons?
Asking questions is one way of stock-taking, allowing to
reflect on what has been achieved, what is the status quo,
and where should we go from here. Somewhat paradoxi-
cally, part of the answers to those questions lies in the ques-
tions themselves. From these questions it seems apparent
that CPS research does have problems. These problems,
some of them more complex than others, suggest issues
with identity, direction and purpose. It is my impression
that many of these issues are largely self-inflicted, which
nurtures my optimism that resolving these is in our hands,
or stated more appropriately, in our minds. The distinc-
tion between hands and minds shall also serve as reminder
of the importance of the substantive, or the conceptual,
and of the role the empirical has as a means to an end in
the process of conducting empirical research in the social
sciences. It therefore provides some orientation for how
to address the problems complex problem solving has to
solve.
Diversity
To get anywhere near a meaningful starting point for reflec-
tions on the above-stated questions, we first need to deter-
mine what CPS stands for. As it turns out, this is a bigger
problem as anticipated by some. The label “CPS” has been
used in many, quite different contexts and for diverse pur-
poses. For instance, CPS has been used for labelling a re-
search paradigm employed to study psychological concepts
such as information processing, learning, decision-making,
causal reasoning, knowledge acquisition (see Q4), strategy
use (see Q5), and more. CPS has also been used as a label
for a predominantly cognitive ability (i.e., “complex prob-
lem solving ability”). Another, innocuous but also rather
uninformative use of CPS would be as a label for a class
of observed behaviour that individuals exhibit when con-
fronted with computer-simulated microworlds. These are
just a few examples for the diversity in the use of the la-
bel CPS (i.e., as description of a research methodology,
as description of latent psychological constructs, or as de-
scription of observable behaviour). Such diversity and the
resulting lack of clarity in meaning creates a considerable
1 The exact quote is “... there is always a well-known solution to
every human problem – neat, plausible, and wrong” (Mencken,
1921, p. 158).
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challenge to passing a verdict on CPS research’s raison
d’être (see Q1). This diversity problem will not necessar-
ily be solved by focussing on only one use and ignoring
the other alternative uses. By looking at the body of em-
pirical research on CPS related to abilities one might get
the impression that depending on the correlations found to
scores from other measures of cognitive abilities (e.g., rea-
soning tests), CPS is “narrowed or downgraded” to a skill,
or “widened or upgraded” to a competency, or anything in
between. Such conceptual flexibility is a side effect of a
predominantly operational definition of CPS (i.e., CPS is
what one measures with tasks that carry the label CPS).
Treating ability, skill and competency as synonyms, as it
happens occasionally, makes the problem of vagueness even
worse. Or, as they say, what happens in vagueness stays
in vagueness. There are, of course, attempts to get a more
conceptual handle on the definition problem. In a more
recent attempt to navigate the complex landscape of CPS
research, Dörner and Funke (2017) have suggested that the
term complex problem solving should be reserved for deal-
ings with ill-defined problems. There is some irony in it as
CPS research appears rather ill-defined itself. This seems
to create an odd impasse: Any efforts to define CPS would
make it potentially non-CPS. The situation, however, is a
bit more complex than that. The distinction between well-
defined and ill-defined is not a dichotomy, which creates
the challenge of determining where well-defined ends and
ill-defined begins on an imaginary definition scale. In addi-
tion, problems that were previously considered ill-defined
might become ever so slightly better defined as we progress
in our conceptual understanding. The fact that we tend to
contemplate the same or similar questions over the past 4
decades seem to suggest that the pace with which we make
conceptual progress is rather slow. Whilst this might re-
duce the risk of dealing with moving targets when it comes
to defining CPS, it should not be mistaken as justification
for contend with the status quo. An other way of address-
ing the ambiguity problem and to cater towards a more or
less peaceful co-existence of different conceptual foci and
methodological approaches in CPS research would be to
declare CPS a mere “umbrella” term. Emphasising com-
munalities (e.g., shared interests, goals, and tool use) and
downplaying (real or otherwise) differences has been neces-
sary and strategically functional in the early days of CPS
research when the primary challenge was to establish a
“new idea”. Having reached a state now where everyone
seems to have staked their claims in this mine (heigh-ho,
heigh-ho!) the all-encompassing umbrella has outlived its
usefulness. One side effect of continuing to subsume consid-
erable diversity under a common label is that constructive
impulses (e.g., via feedback from outside or within CPS re-
search) tend to have limited productive impact as it seems
to be always “the others” who should take notice. It is not
too difficult to see how that can stifle conceptual progress
in a research area such as CPS.
A non-definition of an ill-defined problem
In seeming contradiction to the above-mentioned notion of
“true” CPS being ill-defined, I continue with an attempt to
offer some clarifications regarding the term complex prob-
lem solving. I start at the end: problem solving. A simple,
yet powerful and therefore widely accepted framework of
problem solving posits that all problems are comprised of
three components: a current state of affairs; a goal state
of affairs; and a set of steps that need to be taken to move
from one to the other. I would argue that this applies
even to ill-defined problems. Problems vary in ways of
which these components are specified or known, and which
of these components are expected to be identified by the
problem solver. That means, the actual problem could be
either to identify the set of actions needed to reach a goal
state, or to find out what the unknown end state is going to
be, or to “backward engineer” what the initial state of af-
fairs was given the end state and the set of transition rules.
For example, in a performance management context, hav-
ing received feedback that current performance levels are
deemed unsatisfactory (i.e., evaluative framing of the cur-
rent state of affairs) and being made aware of what the ex-
pected performance levels are (i.e., defining the goal state
of affairs) leaves one with the problem of identifying how
to move from one to the other. Or, in the aftermath of a
financial collapse of a company one might be tasked with
identifying “where it all went wrong”. The problem solving
focus here would be on the transition processes from retro-
spectively inferred previous states of affairs that have led
to the current state of affairs. Another example might be
to estimate the likelihood of convalescence (i.e., goal state
of affairs) given the clinical symptoms presented in a pa-
tient (i.e., current state of affairs) and the knowledge about
the effect principles of a specific combination of treatments
(i.e., set of probabilistic transitions). Based on such rather
simple framework using three basic problem components
and varying what is known and what is unknown has the
potential to capture a wide range of (even “real-life”, see
Q2) problems. Problems, of course, also differ with regard
to the level of detail with which these components are or
can be specified. “Real-life” problems tend to be more to-
wards the lower end of this spectrum and might therefore
be considered ill-defined. Here the effort required in clari-
fying the current state of affairs and / or the desired state
of affairs can be much greater than figuring out the actual
steps that need to be taken to move from one to the other
(Wood, Cogin, & Beckmann, 2009). When striving for
real life relevancy it is worth to keep in mind that not all
“real-life” problems are necessarily “ill-defined” and being
“ill-defined” does not make a problem a “real-life” prob-
lem. Real life relevance (see Q3) or “ecological validity”
(as one of those terms aﬄicted by inflationary use) of CPS
is neither “proven” via correlations with some “real-life”
variables (see Q2), nor achieved by “making it look like the
real thing”. The use of semantically enriched cover stories
and accordingly labelled variables in CPS tasks can be seen
as one example for such attempts. As it has been shown
(e.g., Beckmann & Goode, 2014, 2017) this has more often
than not detrimental effects on the quality of what is mea-
sured in the end. As Borsboom and colleagues remind us
“. . . the problem of validity cannot be solved by psychome-
tric techniques or models alone. On the contrary, it must
be addressed by substantive theory. Validity is the one
problem in testing that psychology cannot contract out to
methodology” (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & Van Heerden,
2004, p. 1062). Reflections in relation to Q2 could ben-
efit from a better conceptual foundation. One impulse to
that effect could come from Lewin’s notion of Geschehen-
styp (or “principle of the type of event”, as an imperfect
translation, Lewin, 1927/1992). It posits that the task
paradigm used in experimental, laboratory-based research
needs to reflect the structure and function of the processes
involved in the class of real-life situations that is targeted
(see Q3). It is the “common logic of research in the labo-
ratory and the field” what generalisation claims have to be
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based on (Gadenne, 1976). In the context of CPS research
this means that cognitive (or otherwise) processes triggered
by experimental tasks need to overlap with what we expect
to take place when dealing with said real-life problems. As
said, this cannot be achieved through attempts to create
some form of superficial resemblance of surface features
(such as variable labels) between lab task and targeted
real-life problem. It means, however, that some ex ante
ideas are needed about both the real-life problem and the
laboratory task (see Q3). Such ideas have to be derived
from theory based task analyses. Consulting what psycho-
logical theories have to offer (truly) prior to engaging in
data collection reduces the risk of declaring post hoc in-
terpretations of correlation patterns as “proof of a theory”.
Another advantage of putting the conceptual horse back in
front of the empirical carriage is that it will help us to iden-
tify where gaps exist in our theories. Meaningful research
should focus on strengthening the theoretical foundations
of our conceptual understanding of the psychological pro-
cesses involved when people attempt to deal with complex,
dynamically changing challenges in their lives. The empiri-
cal side of research is a means to that end. Consulting “the
oracle of numbers” instead cannot serve as a substitute for
the conceptual work we ought to be doing.
The elephant in the ... problem space
After some clarifications regarding problem solving, I will
now focus on the remaining component of the term CPS,
which is “complex”. As has been discussed previously at
lengths and in detail (Beckmann & Goode, 2017; see also
Beckmann, Birney & Goode, 2017; Beckmann, 2010; Bir-
ney, Beckmann, & Seah, 2016), I argue that the lack of
a shared understanding of what we mean by complexity
in CPS research is the major barrier to any meaningful
progress. This problem is rooted in a predominantly data-
driven take on CPS, which promotes the tendency to put
the (empirical) cart before the (conceptual) horse. In re-
search that starts with data and ends with data the con-
cept of complexity is substituted by the notion of difficulty.
Difficulty, however, is a psychometric concept with limited
conceptual and explanatory reach. It descriptively informs
us about that one challenge (e.g., an intelligence test item
or a CPS task) has been successfully tackled by fewer peo-
ple than another challenge. The former is then declared
being more difficult than the latter. If one were interested
in the reasons for such outcome (i.e., an explanation), one
would be left with a tautological argument (i.e., because
more people solved the second problem). Simply replac-
ing difficulty with complexity, as it happens notoriously
often in CPS research, will not provide an explanation. As
stated previously “. . . complexity reflects ex ante consid-
erations of the cognitive demands imposed by the task and
the circumstances under which the task is to be performed
. . . , which makes complexity a primarily cognitive concept.
Difficulty, in contrast, is experiential, person-bound and by
definition, statistical” (Beckmann, Birney, & Goode, 2017,
p. 2). By using difficulty and complexity interchangeably
one mistakes descriptions for explanations.
We need to understand, or
description 6= explanation
Some research where certain result patterns are interpreted
as indications of intuition (see Q6) or strategy (see Q5)
could serve as examples for such tendency. The term “in-
tuition” seems all too readily be used as an “explanation”
for situations where perceived success in problem solving
is seemingly independent of structural, causal, strategic,
or prior “world-knowledge” (see Q4). Such constellation
of knowledge-free success could, however, be an effect of
employing ineffective measures of problem-relevant knowl-
edge, which often is a result of a weak conceptual founda-
tion of the operationalisation of knowledge in CPS. There
are, of course, other potential reasons for not finding corre-
lational links between knowledge and problem solving per-
formance. For instance, when problem solvers are asked to
bring a system’s current state to a set goal state, they
might follow the simple, knowledge free heuristic of an
intervention-by-intervention optimisation (e.g., Beckmann
& Goode, 2017; Beckmann & Guthke, 1995). Labelling
such interaction behaviour “intuition” would be mislead-
ing. An uncritical use of “intuition” in CPS creates the
considerable risk of masking remaining limitations in our
conceptualisation (i.e., underpinning theories) and oper-
ationalisation (i.e., the variables derived from measures),
and the links between the two. The underlying problem
is that many labels we tend to use for describing observed
phenomena in CPS carry pseudo-explanatory meanings, so
that descriptions are being mistaken as explanations. This
also applies to the use of “strategy” (see Q5) for labelling
clusters of interaction patterns that have been identified by
statistical routines trawling sets of secondary data (a.k.a.
log file analysis). Again, “intuition” would be an attrac-
tive candidate for labelling interaction behaviour that has
resulted in acceptable outcomes, yet does not exceed the
statistically necessary systematicity threshold for consti-
tuting a “strategy” cluster. In other words, failing to iden-
tify some sort of systematicity pattern (or residual, in sta-
tistical terms) in the average problem solver’s interaction
with the task, which would otherwise be given the label
“strategy X”, is not necessarily a reason for labelling it
“intuition”. In the context of strategy-focussed CPS re-
search that starts with a priori considerations of how ef-
fective and efficient interaction behaviour for knowledge
acquisition should look like, the so-called VOTAT2 strat-
egy plays a prominent role. VOTAT, however, has little
relevance in dealing with real world problems as complex,
dynamic (“ill-defined”?) problems faced “in the wild” as
such problems tend to not afford one with the freedom to
vary none or only one variable at a time. Hence, strate-
gies used by successful problem solvers in the lab will not
necessarily separate the successful from the less success-
ful problem solvers in real life (see Q2, Q3, & Q5). Us-
ing expert-novice comparisons as another example for a
research topic within CPS (see Q7), conceptual ground-
work needs to clarify a few basics before engaging in data
collection (or the analysis of existing data). For instance:
Given that expertise is domain and knowledge specific, and
given that “true” complex problem solving is “ill-defined”
and/or “ill-structured”, what CPS expertise would look
like? The answer to this question has implications for how
to measure CPS expertise. Another issue that should be
addressed conceptually prior to engaging in the empirical
2 VOTAT, which stands for vary-one-variable-at-a-time, is only
functional if such interaction behaviour is preceded by a zero in-
tervention, which is needed to identify autonomic changes in the
to be explored system. Therefore, the “desired” strategy should
be more appropriately labelled VONAT (Vary-One-or-None-At-
a-Time, Beckmann, Birney, & Goode, 2017, p. 4; Beckmann
and Goode, 2014; p. 279; Beckmann and Goode, 2017, p. 9).
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would be: Does it take 10 years of deliberate practice to
become an expert in CPS? If so, what would be consid-
ered deliberate practice in CPS? Or, do the artificial time
horizons as they are typical for computerised CPS tasks
or simulations allow for a more time efficient acquisition
of expertise? Does (extensive) experience in dealing with
CPS tasks as they are used in CPS research satisfy the
criterion of expertise? Given the diversity of approaches
to measure CPS, predictions (i.e., made prior to “knowing
the outcome”) of where expertise is expected to shine and
where not would be needed. Otherwise one is confronted
with a situation where those who outperform others are
post hoc declared experts, which, of course, will have lim-
ited exploratory value. Unexpected (or undesired?) cor-
relation patterns can be dealt with by either expressing
doubts regarding the status of expertise achieved by prob-
lem solvers involved in the study, or by referring to the
limited accessibility of experts’ knowledge – be it declar-
ative or strategic (see Q4) – due to their higher levels of
cognitive automatization, which, consequently, might even
lead to the “conclusion” that experts come to problem solu-
tions intuitively (see Q6). Post hoc interpretations such as
these are readily available to “protect” a potentially inad-
equate conceptual foundation from being challenged (and
eventually improved).
Structure in the ill-structured
Research in CPS (as is the case for any empirical research
in the social sciences) can be characterised as a hierarchy of
three objectives. These are description, explanation and in-
tervention. “. . . a proper description of the phenomena of
interest is a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition for
developing adequate levels of understanding of the causal
mechanisms that underlie them. An adequate understand-
ing or explanation of the phenomena under question is,
again, a necessary, yet not sufficient precondition for re-
search to have meaningful impact in the “real world,” for
example, in form of effective interventions.” (Beckmann,
2018, p. 121). Each objective calls upon specific sets
of methodologies, including research design and sampling.
For instance, the analysis of secondary observational data –
as it is the foundation of log file analyses – would represent
a mismatch to ambitions of establishing an understanding
of causal effects. Or, if we were to consult the seven dwarfs
in the well-known fairy tale: While going about their min-
ing work enthusiastically the short folks sing “We dig dig
dig . . . up everything in sight; We dig up diamonds by
the score; A thousand rubies, sometimes more; But we
don’t know what we dig ’em for; We dig dig dig a-dig dig
. . . ”. I am inclined to interpret these lyrics as a reminder
of the potential risks that lie in data mining. Based on
descriptive data we cannot make (post hoc) conceptual, ex-
planatory claims. Descriptions of observed effects should
not be interpreted as evidence of understanding. To avoid
misunderstandings, log file analyses are certainly useful ap-
proaches to describe problem solvers’ (average) behaviour
interacting with computerised CPS tasks. Results of log-
file analyses can be effective in forming preliminary spec-
ulations about cognitive, conative or other psychological
processes involved. Such speculations, translated in hy-
potheses, however, need to be properly tested in controlled
experiments before we can claim to have gained some con-
ceptual insights regarding their role in CPS.
Conclusion = Solution?
In this paper I have shared thoughts regarding some issues
in CPS research that were innervated by a set of seven ques-
tions raised by the editors of this special issue. I wish these
reflections to be perceived as an encouragement to a rever-
sion to the conceptual foundations of problem solving and
decision making. If CPS research were to do so, I suspect
two things to emerge. On the one hand, I expect a realisa-
tion that we already know more than our current research
practices seem to suggest. On the other hand, however, we
will notice that our theoretical foundation has substantial
limitations in describing, explaining and prescribing real
world problem solving. Our efforts should primarily be di-
rected towards the development or refinement of problem
solving theories. Deficits in theory cannot be compensated
for, by, say, larger sets of data. Such necessary reorien-
tation would have to start with research geared towards
a thorough description of the phenomena of interest (but
without misinterpreting this as explanation), which then
creates the foundation for research that aims to establish
an understanding of these phenomena. The methodology
necessary for that differs considerably from the one suitable
for the purpose of description. Only if subsequent research
efforts to prescribe interventions or pedagogies are based
on such understanding, will we be in a promising position
to devise effective strategies for the development and ac-
quisition of problem solving competencies that enable in-
dividuals or groups of individuals to tackle the complex
challenges in real life. This stricture also applies to using
CPS tasks as assessment tools. Their meaningfulness and
usefulness cannot be established by primarily relying on
correlation matrices, it rather requires sufficient levels of
conceptual understanding first. The linchpin of such repri-
oritisation of research efforts in CPS is a solid conceptual
understanding of complexity. I started with the expecta-
tion that the seven questions stated at the beginning can-
not be addressed by one single answer (as it was the case
for the questions asked by the seven dwarfs as they tried
to establish who has broken into their house). I would like
to argue, however, that these seven CPS-related questions
should be addressed by a single question: Why do we not
have a better understanding of what complexity means in
complex problem solving? If we continue to fail addressing
this question, we are likely to mull over the same seven
questions stated in the beginning of this paper in, say, ten
years’ time, should CPS research not already have fallen
into disregard by then. As it was a stumble that brought
Snow White back to life in the fairy tale, I hope that an
overdue step change in CPS research, namely to start with
theory and not with data, will breathe fresh life into it too.
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